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THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF FOR
STATE PRISONERS
RONALD D. POLTORACK*
After reviewing the historical expansion of the writ of habeas
corpus to allow broader federal relief for state prisoners, the au-
thor examines the more recent trend of limiting the bounds of
habeas corpus, especially as a result of the Stone v. Powell
decision. Based on an examination of the evolution of the
modern-day writ, the author predicts future developments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Habeas corpus is a collateral attack' on a proceeding, usually
criminal, which results in some type of confinement. It is not a
substitute for an appeal;2 rather it is a civil3 remedy for testing the
legality of the petitioner's detention.
The "Great Writ," as it is often called,4 has undergone much
change in the history of American jurisprudence. As a result of
judicial interpretation of the Constitution, congressional enact-
ments, and the common law, the availability of federal habeas relief
* Member, University of Miami Law Review.
1. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.
CI. L. REv. 142 (1970).
2. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 448 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
485 (1953).
3. Fisher ex rel. Barcelon v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 181 (1906); R. SOKOL, A HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 3 (1965).
4. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474 n.6 (1976); D. MRADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA
CARTA 4 (1966).
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for state prisoners has been expanded in some respects and limited
in others. The purpose of this article is to trace those expansions and
limitations and to attempt to predict future change in light of recent
judicial trends.
II. HISTORY
Habeas corpus, like much of American law, was inherited from
England.5 The Constitution, however, does not expressly provide for
the writ. It merely provides that "the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it."' Federal habeas relief was provided
for in fact by the Judiciary Act of 1789. 7 Although the Act vested
federal courts with habeas jurisdiction, it failed to define clearly its
applicability. The Act merely provided for such relief "agreeable to
the principles and usages of law." 8 Therefore, courts looked to the
English common law to ascertain the bounds of federal habeas juris-
diction.' As a result, habeas relief was limited "to an inquiry as to
the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal."'"
The first major extension of federal habeas relief was made by
the Judiciary Act of 1867 which expanded it to include state prison-
ers." Although the Act has had a great impact in light of subsequent
developments, it is arguable that the Act had little effect at the
time.'2 In 1867, habeas was limited to jurisdictional attacks; thus,
the inclusion of state prisoners within the scope of habeas relief
afforded little added protection because state jurisdictional issues
would rarely present a federal question. With the expansion of ha-
beas relief beyond jurisdictional attacks, however, protections af-
forded to state prisoners have become significant.' 3
At first, the substantive scope of the "Great Writ" was ex-
panded by broadly construing the term "jurisdiction." In Ex parte
Lange,4 for example, the Court granted a writ of habeas corpus
where the sentencing tribunal imposed a sentence which it was
without power to impose. In Ex parte Siebold,5 the concept of juris-
5. D. MEADOR, supra note 4, at 61.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
7. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82.
8. Id. at 82.
9. 428 U.S. 465, 474 (1976).
10. Id.
11. Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
12. D. MEADOR, supra note 4, at 62.
13. Id. at 55-70.
14. 85 U.S. 163 (1873).
15. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
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diction was expanded even further. The conviction rested on an
unconstitutional statute, and the Court granted the writ on the
theory that a court has no jurisdiction to try a person on a charge
which may not constitutionally be made a criminal act.8 The broad
interpretations of "jurisdiction" eventually led to a recognition that
all detentions which violate the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States are cognizable by a habeas corpus petition.
The case of Frank v. Magnum8 provided the first indication
that nonjurisdictional attacks would be within the scope of habeas
review. Although the Court denied habeas, it did recognize that
violations of due process are reviewable by a federal habeas court.'9
The petition was denied solely because the state procedures em-
ployed were found to have complied with the requirements of due
process. 0 A few years later, a writ of habeas corpus was granted on
the grounds of a due process violation in Moore v. Dempsey.'
If the break with the common law limitation of habeas to juris-
dictional attacks was not complete after Frank and Moore, it was
certainly complete after Brown v. Allen2" and Fay v. Noia.Y As the
Court stated in Fay: "The course of decisions of this Court from
Lange and Siebold to the present makes plain that restraints con-
trary to our fundamental law, the Constitution, may be challenged
on federal habeas corpus even though imposed pursuant to the con-
viction of a federal court of competent jurisdiction."2
After Fay, there was no longer any question about the right to
attack a state court conviction by seeking federal habeas relief
whenever a federal question was presented. Literally read, the cur-
rent version of the United States Code supports the decision in Fay.
Enacted in 1948, it provides that a "[federal] court shall entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . only on the ground
that [the petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States."25 Despite the apparent
literal meaning of this provision, it was not comprehended as alter-
16. Id. at 376-77.
17. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
18. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
19. Id. at 332 (petition alleged that mob domination of the trial infringed the right to
due process of law under the fourteenth amendment).
20. Id. at 338.
21. 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob domination of trial).
22. 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (discriminatory jury selection and coerced confession).
23. 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (coerced confession).
24. Id. at 409.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1970). A similar provision relates to federal prisoners. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1970).
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ing the common law rule which limited habeas relief to jurisdic-
tional attacks.6 Otherwise, Brown and Fay-decided five and fif-
teen years respectively after the enactment of the statute-would
have been much easier cases.
II. REQUIREMENTS
A. Federal Questions
As previously noted, a federal court has jurisdiction to grant a
writ of habeas corpus only when a federal question is presented by
the petitioner." A mere allegation of error will not confer jurisdic-
tion in the absence of a federal question. "[A federal] court should
not provide collateral relief simply because the state court's chal-
lenged conduct would have led to reversal if the defendant had been
tried in the federal system; nor is relief authorized even if state
evidentiary rules appear to have been violated." A constitutional
violation may be raised either through a specific provision or by
factors which render the conviction so unfair as to be violative of due
process. One of the major reasons that the scope of federal habeas
relief has been greatly expanded is that the Court has broadly con-
strued many of the constitutional protections, including due process
and equal protection.9
In addition to presenting a federal question, the petitioner must
establish that the assigned error was reversible error. When the error
assigned is harmless, the writ will not be granted."
B. In Custody
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus can only be used to test
the validity of a conviction when the petitioner is "in custody."',
Courts traditionally have interpreted this requirement broadly:
"Custody does not necessarily mean actual physical detention in a
jail or prison. Rather the term is synonomous with restraint of
liberty.''3
26. Irwin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959).
27. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2255 (1970).
"A necessary predicate for the granting of federal habeas relief. . . is a determination
by the federal court that such custody violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975).
28. Blankenship v. Estelle, 545 F.2d 510, 516 (5th Cir. 1977).
29. D. MEADOR, supra note 4, at 55.
30. Meeks v. Havener, 545 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1976); Vitello v. Gaughan, 544 F.2d 17 (1st
Cir. 1976). See also notes 81-91 and accompanying text infra.
31. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254-2255 (1970).
32. S. SOKOL, supra note 3, at 19.
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In Jones v. Cunningham and Hensley v. Municipal Court,34
the Supreme Court reviewed the problem and proceeded to enumer-
ate the relevant factors in determining whether the petitioner is "in
custody." These factors are: (1) whether the petitioner is subject to
restraints not shared by the general public; (2) whether the peti-
tioner is free to travel from the jurisdiction; (3) whether failure to
abide by the restraints imposed constitutes a criminal offense; and
(4) whether the petitioner is free from actual physical custody
merely by the grace of the state.35
Judicial interpretations of "in custody," prompted perhaps by
Jones and Hensley, have been far reaching. Habeas jurisdiction has
been recognized in the following situations: (1) where the petitioner
is free on his own recognizance; 36 (2) where the petitioner is on
probation;37 (3) where the petitioner is on parole; 38 (4) where the
petitioner is a military draftee; 39 and (5) where the petitioner is
serving the first of two consecutive sentences where he seeks to
challenge only the second." On the other hand, jurisdiction has been
found wanting where the petitioner is merely subject to a fine which,
even if it remained unpaid, could not result in imprisonment.4'
In Carafas v. La Vallee, 2 one of the more controversial decisions
in the area, the Court granted habeas relief to a petitioner who had
completed his sentence and had been unconditionally released from
prison. The Court concluded that even though the petitioner was no
longer in actual physical custody, his liberty had been restricted as
a direct result of the conviction, since he was neither eligible to vote
nor to serve as a union official.43 Thus, the petitioner was "in cus-
tody" under the meaning of section 2254(a).
It appears that the Court may have overlooked the nature of the
writ. The purpose of habeas relief should be to provide a remedy for
detention in violation of federal law. Where, as in Carafas, the peti-
tioner has finished serving his sentence, it is no longer the detention
33. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
34. 411 U.S. 345 (1973).
35. Id. at 351-52; 371 U.S. at 239-42.
36. E.g., Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973); Kolski v. Watkins, 544 F.2d
762 (5th Cir. 1976).
37. E.g., Bible v. Arizona, 449 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 994,
rehearing denied, 406 U.S. 911 (1972).
38. E.g., United States ex rel. Scranton v. New York, 532 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1976).
39. E.g., Ex parte Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
40. E.g., Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
41. Wright v. Bailey, 544 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1976).
42. 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
43. Id. at 237.
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that is being attacked by the writ. In such a case the writ is actually
aimed at the conviction.
Of course, the Carafas decision may be supported by a liberal
application of the restraint of liberty theory espoused in Jones and
Hensley. Loss of civil rights certainly restricts one's liberty to an
extent, but it remains to be determined just how far the concept of
restricted liberty can be extended in the context of federal habeas
relief. Under Carafas, it may be that any loss of a constitutional
right would satisfy the "in custody" requirement. Such an interpre-
tation would serve to extend significantly the availability of habeas
relief,"
C. Exhaustion of State Remedies
A precondition to the availability of federal habeas relief to
state prisoners is that state remedies must be exhausted before ap-
plication for a writ is instituted. 5 This requirement reflects both the
common law" and federal-state comity principles. 7 The underlying
theory is that a federal court should not release a state prisoner until
the state has had every available opportunity to correct errors com-
mitted in the proceedings which resulted in the allegedly illegal
confinement." Once the requirement of exhaustion is met, however,
a strong constitutional interest exists in vesting federal courts with
habeas jurisdiction over state prisoners: "The State court cannot
have the last say when it, though on fair consideration and what
procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived a
federal constitutional right.""9
Section 2254(b) provides two exceptions to the exhaustion re-
quirement. Exhaustion of state remedies is not required where there
"is either an absence of available State corrective process or the
existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to pro-
tect the rights of the prisoner." 0 A third exception may be discerned
from the decision in Mucie v. Missouri State Dept. of Corrections.5
44. The "in custody" requirement applies to federal prisoners as well as it does to state
prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
45. The exhaustion requirement applies only to state prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)
(1970). A federal prisoner, however, must first move the sentencing court for relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1970).
46. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944), rev'd and remanded, 326 U.S. 271 (1945);
Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179 (1907); Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101 (1898).
47. Mucie v. Missouri State Dep't of Corrections, 543 F.2d 633, 636 (8th Cir. 1976).
48. Ballard v. Maggio, 544 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1977).
49. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 508 (1953) (concurring opinion by Frankfurter, J.).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970).
51. 543 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1976).
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The court in Mucie held that a prisoner will not be denied habeas
relief if the "failure" to exhaust state remedies resulted from inten-
tional and unnecessary 'delay by prosecuting state attorneys. Such
an exception is supportable on grounds of public policy; otherwise,
state officials may render habeas relief inadequate by merely delay-
ing court procedures. The reasoning is also supported by the second
exception of section 2254(b), since such a delay would certainly
render the available state corrective process ineffective. Addition-
ally, it may well be mandated by the due process clause.2 Where
the action of state attorneys effectively frustrates relief, it would
appear that a prisoner is being deprived of his liberty by persons
acting under color of state law contrary to the dictates of the four-
teenth amendment.
Whenever a state corrective process is not utilized by the peti-
tioner, the exhaustion requirement is implicated. In Pitchess v.
Davis,. the Supreme Court held that the petitioner had not yet
exhausted state remedies after seeking writs of habeas corpus and
mandamus at the state level. Denial of the writs was not considered
an adjudication on the merits and there remained other normal
channels for review. In Ballard v. Maggio," the fifth circuit held
that a failure to appeal the denial of a petition for habeas corpus to
the state supreme court was not a failure to exhaust state remedies
where the state court had decided those issues against the petitioner
on direct review. The import of these two decisions is that where a
remedy exists, exhaustion will not be recognized unless the court
which has jurisdiction over the remaining corrective process has
decided the particular issue against the petitioner at some prior
stage of the proceeding.
Two interesting problems in the application of the exhaustion
requirement are: (1) where a subsequent court decision clearly indi-
cates the illegality of the petitioner's detention; and (2) where sev-
eral grounds for relief are asserted in the habeas petition, but state
remedies have not been exhausted on all those grounds. In Francisco
v. Gathright,5" the Supreme Court held that where a subsequent
state court decision indicates the invalidity of a conviction, a federal
court may grant habeas without sending the issue back to the state
courts; no further exhaustion is required. This result may be ques-
tioned in light of the purposes of the exhaustion requirement. It
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
53. 421 U.S. 482 (1975).
54. 544 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1977).
55. 419 U.S. 59 (1974).
1977]
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would seem that principles of comity would require the case to be
sent back to the state court system, where the errors could be cor-
rected without federal interference. The result is sound, however, in
view of the fact that the petitioner had fully exhausted state reme-
dies prior to the subsequent state court decision. Thus, the state
court had been afforded a full and complete opportunity to correct
errors, and strict adherence to the letter and spirit of the exhaustion
requirement had been achieved.
Two recent circuit court cases, St. Pierre v. Helgemoe8 and
Franklin v. Conway,57 have held that a subsequent decision of the
United States Supreme Court on an issue presented by a habeas
petition precludes federal relief until the state courts have had an
opportunity to reconsider the case. Although these decisions may
seem in conflict with the decision of the Supreme Court in
Francisco, a rational distinction exists. Francisco involved a subse-
quent state court decision while St. Pierre and Franklin involved
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. A state court should be given
an opportunity to reevaluate state law in light of new Supreme
Court guidelines. If the subsequent decision is rendered by the
state's own court, however, there has been no intervening change
except that which was effectuated by the state court itself. In such
circumstances, the state court has already been afforded a full op-
portunity to correct the errors. 8 Francisco merely denies the state
courts a second chance to correct error. Therefore, these cases are
not only reconcilable, but they are also strongly supported by the
policy considerations of complete and efficient state adjudication.
There is a substantial split among the federal circuits as to the
effect of a failure to exhaust available remedies for all of the grounds
asserted in a habeas petition. The fifth59 and ninth0 circuits require
exhaustion of all issues before entertaining a habeas petition. On the
other hand, the second,8 third,82 fourth, 3 and eighth 4 circuits will
56. 545 F.2d 1306 (1st Cir. 1976).
57. 546 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1976).
58. In Francisco the state had conceded that the petitioner had exhausted available state
remedies. 419 U.S. at 60.
59. Galtieri v. Wainwright, 545 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1977); West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026
(5th Cir. 1973), modified on rehearing en banc, 510 F.2d 363 (1975).
60. James v. Reese, 546 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1976); Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807 (9th
Cir. 1976).
61. Cameron v. Fastoff, 543 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Levy v.
McMann, 394 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1968).
62. United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 372 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1967), rev'd and
remanded on rehearing en banc, 398 F.2d 896 (1968).
63. Hewitt v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969).
64. Johnson v. United States District Court, 519 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1975).
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review any ground that has been exhausted even though there exists
an adequate remedy for other asserted grounds.
A literal reading of the exhaustion requirement seems to indi-
cate that all grounds must be exhausted before a federal court may
entertain a habeas petition. Furthermore, it is possible that, given
the additional opportunity to review one of the unexhausted
grounds, the state court may grant the writ, thus avoiding the ne-
cessity of federal intervention. In practice, however, this view is
unrealistic. The requirement that all asserted grounds be exhausted
may easily be circumvented. The petitioner may choose to assert
only those grounds which have been exhausted. Then, if he does not
prevail on any of those grounds, he may proceed to exhaust state
remedies on the other grounds. If he is unsuccessful in utilizing the
available state corrective processes, he may file another petition
asserting the remaining grounds on which state remedies have since
been exhausted. 5 In this manner, the prisoner is able to circumvent
the requirement that all asserted grounds be exhausted, without
forfeiting the right to assert any other ground in a subsequent pro-
ceeding. Thus, the sounder view is to allow review on any issue
which has been exhausted at the state level."6
IV. THE EFFECT OF PROCEDURAL WAIVERS ON FEDERAL HABEAS RELIEF
Prior to Fay v. Noia,"7 it was held that a procedural waiver
would preclude the availability of federal habeas relief. 8 The ration-
ale for such a decision is that where the prisoner has waived his right
to object on appeal, there is an "adequate and independent state
ground" to support the conviction. 9 In a sense, this can be viewed
as a failure to exhaust state remedies. Although no remedy existed
at the time the habeas petition was filed, it was the petitioner's own
fault that an otherwise available state remedy had been foreclosed.
The theory that a procedural waiver would automatically bar
habeas relief was categorically rejected in Fay v. Noia. Writing for
the majority, Justice Brennan noted that the purpose of habeas
corpus is to protect against illegal detention and that "a forfeiture
of remedies does not legitimize the unconstitutional conduct by
which [a] conviction was procured."70 In defense of the broad hold-
65. Cf. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) (petitioner may file a new application
for any ground not decided in a prior application).
66. See notes 58-61, supra.
67. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
68. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 482-87 (1953).
69. Id.
70. 372 U.S. at 428.
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ing, Justice Brennan wrote: "Our decision today swings open no
prison gates. Today as always few indeed is the number of state
prisoners who eventually win their freedom by means of federal
habeas corpus." '71
Not surprisingly, the Burger Court severely limited Fay by cre-
ating exceptions which virtually swallowed the rule that procedural
waivers would not bar federal habeas relief.7 The first exception,
however, came from Justice Brennan in the course of his opinion in
Fay: "We therefore hold that the federal habeas judge may in his
discretion deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately by-
passed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has
forfeited his state court remedies. '73
This exception was the basis for Justice Brennan's majority
opinion in Henry v. Mississippi,74 which remanded the cause for a
determination of whether or not the failure to raise a fourth amend-
ment objection was deliberate. Although Henry is in concert with
Fay, later decisions are not so easy to reconcile. Justice Brennan was
to dissent often in response to the Burger Court's limitations on the
rule of Fay.
In McMann v. Richardson75 and Tolet v. Henderson,71 the
Court held that a guilty plea entered on the competent advice of
counsel waives the right to attack a confession on the ground that
it was coerced. On its face, the rule of McMann and Tolet seems
to follow the Fay exception for deliberate waivers; however, the
petitions in McMann alleged physical violence by the police, threats
of false charges, threats that counsel would not be provided, and
ineffective counsel.77 These allegations, if proven, would clearly
have established that the waivers were not made deliberately.
Under Townsend v. Sain,71 which is still good law after Stone v.
Powell,79 an evidentiary hearing should have been conducted to ex-
amine the petitioner's allegations. 8° If the allegations were substan-
tiated at such a hearing, habeas relief would then be available.
The decision in Fay was again seemingly ignored in Francis v.
71. Id. at 440.
72. See notes 75-86 and accompanying text infra.
73. 372 U.S. at 438 (emphasis added).
74. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
75. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
76. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
77. 397 U.S. 762-64.
78. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
79. 428 U.S. at 494 n.36.
80. 372 U.S. at 312.
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Henderson8 and Davis v. United States.2 In these cases, habeas
relief was denied on the ground that the defendants had, under
applicable rules of criminal procedure, waived their right to object
to certain allegedly unconstitutional procedures which led to their
conviction. Fay, however, not only held that the exhaustion require-
ment pertained exclusively to remedies still open at the time the
application for habeas was filed, 3 but also held that habeas would
only be denied on the grounds that the applicant "has deliberately
by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing
has forfeited his state court remedies."84 Thus, Francis and Davis
should not have been denied habeas solely because they had com-
mitted a procedural waiver at trial. Under Fay, such a waiver should
serve as a bar to federal habeas relief only if it is found to be deliber-
ate.
The real question before the court is: How far should the rule
of Fay extend? If a procedural waiver or forfeiture precludes habeas
relief only when it is deliberate, then it is arguable that criminal
rules of procedure pertaining to waiver and forfeiture of rights are
rendered nugatory:
If defendants were allowed to flout [procedural rules], there
would be little incentive to comply with its terms when a success-
ful attack might simply result in a new indictment prior to the
trial. Strong tactical considerations would militate in favor of
delaying the raising of the claim in hopes of an acquittal, with
the thought that if those hopes did not materialize, the claim
would be used to upset an otherwise valid conviction at a time
when prosecution might well be difficult.85
It is submitted, however, that this problem was not unresolved
by Fay. Where a defendant properly fails to raise an objection for
strategic reasons, he may be denied habeas relief under the deliber-
ate waiver exception of Fay. Thus, Francis and Davis could have
been disposed of on the basis of Fay.
The key difference between Fay, and the Francis and Davis
decisions lies in the burden of proof. Under Fay, it would appear
that the burden of establishing a deliberate waiver is on the prosecu-
tion.8 On the other hand, Francis and Davis place the burden on
81. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
82. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
83. 312 U.S. at 435.
84. Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
85. 411 U.S. at 241. See also 425 U.S. at 540.
86. Since the petitioner has the benefit of the general rule of Fay, it would seem that
the prosecution has the burden of bringing any particular case within the exception by
affirmatively establishing that the waiver was deliberate.
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the petitioner to show "actual prejudice.""7 By shifting the burden,
the court has significantly limited the effect of Fay.
In Estelle v. Williams,"5 the Court, by means of a broad holding,
effectively ignored Fay even though it could have reached the same
result under the deliberate waiver exception of Fay. The question
presented by Estelle was whether the failure of the defendant to
object to being tried in prison clothes would bar habeas relief on a
claim that he was denied the right to a fair trial. Although the Court
could have rested its decision on the ground that the waiver was
deliberate, 9 it instead chose a rather broad holding:
[A]ithough the state cannot, consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while
dressed in identifiable prison clothes, the failure to make an
objection to the court as to being tried in such clothes, for what-
ever reason, is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion
necessary to establish a constitutional violation.'"
Surprisingly, the reason for the waiver was not deemed impor-
tant. In Fay, a waiver was held to foreclose habeas relief only when
it was made deliberately, while in Estelle the waiver was held to
foreclose habeas relief for whatever reason it was made. Thus,
Estelle can be read as overruling Fay, sub silentio. Justice Brennan
vehemently dissented.9
In Lefkowitz v. Newsome," the Court held that where state law
allows judicial review of constitutional claims after a plea of guilty
is entered, habeas relief may be granted even after the petitioner
had pled guilty. The Court refused to find a waiver where state law
specifically provided for the "preservation" of constitutional attacks
notwithstanding a plea of guilty. This time it was Justice White, the
author of the McMann opinion, who dissented. 3
The vitality of Fay has been severely limited. As it now stands,
a procedural waiver bars habeas relief in at least the following situa-
tions: (1) where the waiver was deliberately made;9" (2) where there
is no showing of actual prejudice;"3 (3) where the waiver was made
87. 425 U.S. at 542; 411 U.S. at 1584.
88. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
89. See generally 425 U.S. at 513-15 (Powell, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 512-13 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 515.
92. 420 U.S. 283 (1975).
93. Id. at 294.
94. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
95. Francis v. Henderson, 96 S. Ct. 1708 (1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233
(1973).
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on the basis of reasonable advice of competent counsel;96 and (4)
where there is an absence of compulsion by the state.97 Additionally,
it is possible to argue that Estelle overruled Fay sub silentio. If that
be the case, habeas relief would be unavailable to any petitioner
who has committed a procedural forfeiture or waiver.
V. FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
Federal habeas relief is only available where the petitioner is in
state custody in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States. 8 Therefore, it has been suggested that claims arising
from the exclusionary rule should not be cognizable by a habeas
petition because the exclusionary rule is judicially rather than con-
stitutionally or statutorily created.9 This view was rejected by the
Court in Kaufman v. United States, 0 but was adopted recently in
the landmark case of Stone v. Powell. 10 The precise holding of Stone
is that, "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may
not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evi-
dence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was intro-
duced at his trial.' '0 2
The Stone decision has prompted much criticism. Justice Bren-
nan, joined by Justice Marshall, questioned the idea that the exclu-
sionary rule was not constitutionally required.03 He argued that the
exclusionary rule could not have been applied to the states in Mapp
v. Ohio' 4 unless it was constitutionally required. 05 Assuming ar-
guendo that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally required,
the question arises as to why Stone was limited to cases where an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing was provided. Presumably,
this limitation is commanded by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Due process, however, requires more than an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing. Unfortunately, no criteria
were set forth to delineate what would constitute an "opportunity"
96. Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970).
97. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
98. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254-2255 (1970).
99. Cf. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (refusal to apply the exclusionary rule to
the states). Wolf, however, was overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
100. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
101. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
102. Id. at 494 (footnotes omitted).
103. See id. at 507-15.
104. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
105. 428 U.S. at 507-15.
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for a full and fair hearing. It is interesting to note, however, that the
Court specifically left Townsend v. Sain'6 intact.0 7 Thus, an evi-
dentiary hearing will be required when there is a dispute as to
whether or not an opportunity for a full and fair hearing was af-
forded by the state courts.
The second circuit addressed the full and fair hearing exception
in Gates v. Henderson. 0 In that case, Stone was held not to require
dismissal of a habeas petition where two of the Townsend catego-
ries' "9 for holding an evidentiary hearing were satisfied. In dissent,
Judge Timbers called the opinion "an artful effort to circumvent
Stone. "10
Notwithstanding Gates' reliance on the Stone exception, other
federal circuits have followed the general rule of Stone."' Clearly,
the granted habeas petition grounded on violations of the exclusion-
ary rule will be the exception and not the rule in the aftermath of
Stone v. Powell.
VI. THE FUTURE SCOPE OF FEDERAL HABEAS RELIEF FOR STATE
PRISONERS
A. "General Analysis
The direction of the Burger Court is toward a narrow construc-
tion of federal habeas jurisdiction. Stone v. Powell is illustrative. It
reflects the concern of the Burger Court with the following factors:
(1) the tremendous expansion of federal habeas relief in light of its
historically limited purposes;" 2 (2) principles of comity;"' (3) the
106. 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Townsend listed the circumstances under which a federal court
must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas applicant:
If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2)
the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole;
(3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to
afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly
discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the
state court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did
not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair hearing.
Id. at 313. 
•
107. 428 U.S. at 494 n.36.
108. 45 U.S.L.W. 2375 (2d Cir. Jan. 12, 1977).
109. 372 U.S. at 313.
110. 45 U.S.L.W. at 2376.
111. Nordskog v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d.69 (5th Cir. 1977); Stinson v. Alabama, 545 F.2d
485 (5th Cir. 1977); Flood v. Louisiana, 545 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1977); United States ex rel.
Placek v. Illinois, 546 F.2d 1298 (7th Cir. 1976); Rigsbee v.Parkinson, 545 F.2d 56 (8th Cir.
1976); Corley v. Cardwell, 544 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1048 (1977);
Redford v. Smith, 543 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1976); Roach v. Parrett, 541 F.2d 772 (8th Cir.
1976).
112. See 428 U.S. 465, 478-79, 487, 491 n.31; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv.
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extent to which the petitioner asserts a colorable claim of inno-
cence; '"4 (4) the reliability of the evidence involved;"' and (5) the
heavy case load of the federal courts."'
B. Federal Questions
An analysis of the factors which motivated the Stone Court
tends to support the proposition that habeas relief will be denied
in cases other than exclusionary rule violations, provided that an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing was afforded at the state level.
In his dissent in Stone, Justice Brennan espoused this view:
I am therefore justified in apprehending that the groundwork is
being laid today for a drastic withdrawal of federal habeas juris-
diction, if not for all grounds of alleged unconstitutional deten-
tion, then at least for claims-for example, of double jeopardy,
entrapment, self-incrimination, Miranda violations, and use of
invalid identification procedures-that this Court later decides
are not "guilt-related."" 7
But in Greene v. Massey"8 the fifth circuit refused to extend Stone
to double jeopardy claims. Stone was distinguished on the ground
that the ban on double jeopardy is specifically enumerated in the
Constitution," '" while the exclusionary rule is judicially created.
This reasoning seems persuasive and, contrary to the fears ex-
pressed by Justice Brennan, it appears that Stone will not be ex-
tended to cases involving a specifically enumerated right.
Thus, where a claim is based on a violation of a judicially
created rule, Stone would appear to be directly controlling.'20 Read
literally, section 2254 habeas relief does not extend to custody in
violation of judicially created rules.'"' This would seem to include
claims of entrapment, Miranda violations, and invalid pretrial iden-
tification procedures.
In this light, Brewer v. Williams,'2 a recent Supreme Court
L. REv. 58, 221 (1976).
113. 428 U.S. at 478 n.11, 491 n.31, 493 n.35; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note
112, at 221.
114. See 428 U.S. at 489-91; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 112, at 219.
115. See 428 U.S. at 497 (Burger, J., concurring); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra
note 1J12, at 219.
116. See 428 U.S. at 491 n.31; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 112, at 221.
117. 428 U.S. at 517-18 (footnote omitted).
118. 546 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1977).
119. Id. at nn.4 & 6.
120. See id.
121. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1970).
122. 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977).
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decision, is somewhat surprising. It was thought that the Court
would have taken the opportunity -as was suggested by twenty-two
states which filed amicus briefs-to extend Stone to Miranda viola-
tions. 13 While it is conceded that the Court could have taken the
opportunity to extend Stone, strong reasons existed for not doing so
in the Brewer case. The significant facts of Brewer are: (1) the police
had broken a promise made to two attorneys not to interrogate the
defendant in their absence; (2) in the course of their interrogations
the police had preyed upon the religious convictions of the defen-
dant whom they knew to have been a mental patient; (3) the defen-
dant's fifth and sixth amendment rights had been violated; and (4)
the state had failed to establish that the defendant made a knowing
and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights.' 4 Given these
facts, Brewer did not present the proper setting upon which to rest
an extension of Stone. Additionally, the Court rested its decision on
sixth amendment grounds' 5 so that it was not a Miranda case.
When the proper case is before the Court, however, it is likely
that the rule of Stone will be extended to Miranda violations, the
Brewer decision notwithstanding. It is suggested that should the
Court extend Stone, the four Miranda rights should be analyzed
separately since one or more of them may be found to be constitu-
tionally required and, therefore, not within the rule of Stone.
C. In Custody
In its narrow perception of the purpose of federal habeas relief,
its concern with the federal caseload, and its strict adherence to the
principles of comity, it is reasonable to expect that the Burger Court
will interpret the in custody requirement of section 225426 more
narrowly than did the Warren Court. Perhaps the broadest reading
of the requirement was made in Carafas v. La Vallee'27 where the
Court held that the petitioner who had finished serving his sentence
was "in custody" because as an ex-convict he was deprived of cer-
tain civil rights.' 8 The Burger Court may wish to review Carafas. If
certiorari is granted in Kravitz v. Pennsylvania, 29 the Court will
have an opportunity to overrule Carafas. Kravitz is so close to
Carafas on its facts that it could have been disposed of on the basis
123. N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
124. 97 S. Ct. 1235-37.
125. Id. at 1239.
126. This requirement also applies to federal prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
127. 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
128. Id. at 237.
129. 546 F.2d 1100 (3d Cir. 1977).
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of Carafas. Perhaps the reason that the third circuit did not choose
to do so is an indication that they believe, as does the author of this
article, that Carafas will be overruled as soon as the Court is pre-
sented with the proper case.
If Carafas is overruled, questions would arise as to how much
further the in custody requirement will be narrowed. It is fairly
certain, however, that the Court would stop short of overruling cases
which have held that parolees and probationers are "in custody"
under the meaning of section 2254(a).'10
D. Exhaustion
Exhaustion of state remedies is the area least likely to be lim-
ited by the Burger Court. The reason is that there is very little room
for change.
Limitations on the exhaustion requirement are most likely to
occur in two areas. First, the Court may seek to define narrowly the
circumstances which render available state corrective processes in-
effective in order to limit the utility of that built-in exception to
section 2254(b).'3 ' Second, the Court may hold that all grounds
asserted in a petition must be exhausted before any grounds will be
addressed by a federal habeas court. 32 Such a holding would be
superflous, however, as it could readily be circumvented.'3
E. The Effect of Procedural Waivers
As previously noted,'3 4 the Burger Court has placed significant
limitations on the Warren Court's decision in Fay v. Noia. 131 Fay
held that a procedural waiver would preclude federal habeas relief
only where the waiver was made deliberately. In light of cases such
as Francis v. Henderson, 136 the extent to which Fay remains good
law is questionable. 137 In either event, it seems that Fay is doomed,
assuming it is not already-dead. The final blow may come on certior-
ari to the Supreme Court in the case of O'Berry v. Wainwright.3 1
In O'Berry, the fifth circuit held that the petitioner received an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing even though a procedural
130. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text, supra.
13L See note 50 and accompanying text, supra.
132. See notes 61-64 and accompanying text, supra.
133. See note 65 and accompanying text, supra.
134. See notes 67-97 and acompanying text, supra.
135. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
136. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
137. Cf. O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1213 n.14 (5th Cir. 1977).
138. Id.
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waiver had been committed by appointed counsel. There was no
finding that the waiver was made deliberately by the petitioner. The
dissenting judge concluded that Fay was treated as though it was
overruled even though Stone presumably left Fay intact.3 '
Should the Court grant certiorari on O'Berry, it is likely that it
will affirm the fifth circuit decision. In fact, it is indeed possible that
the Court will replace the Fay test (whether or not the waiver was
deliberate) with the Stone test (whether or not there was an oppor-
tunity for a full and fair hearing at the state level) for all cases
involving procedural waivers.
F. Fourth Amendment Claims
In the aftermath of Stone, the most significant problem in the
fourth amendment area is what is meant by an "opportunity for
[a] full and fair"'140 hearing. Carried to its furthest extreme, one has
an opportunity for a full and fair hearing as long as state law pro-
vides for a hearing which met rigid due process standards. The
Burger Court is more inclined to the former extreme than the latter.
If "opportunity" is interpreted narrowly, then it may well be
that Stone will be construed as having overruled Fay. Under the
narrow view, one who has committed a procedural error may still
have been afforded an opportunity for a full and fair hearing. Fur-
thermore, it is submitted that the Court is prepared to accept this
view, and O'Berry may present that opportunity.
G. Conclusion
The Burger Court has embarked on a course which has severely
limited the availability of federal habeas corpus relief for state pris-
oners. By so doing, the Court has attempted to serve the following
goals: (1) to decrease the heavy caseload of the federal courts; (2)
to limit the exclusionary rule, which often requires the exclusion of
otherwise reliable evidence;' and (3) to reaffirm the principles of
comity by returning the final word to the state courts in most in-
stances.' In this manner, the Court has begun to shift the emphasis
of habeas relief from the validity of the conviction to the reliability
of the petitioner's claim of innocence. Thus, a colorable claim of
innocence may emerge as the backbone of federal habeas corpus
relief."'
139. Id. at 1219 (dissenting opinion).
140. 428 U.S. at 494.
141. Id. at 489-90.
142. Id. at 478 n.ll.
143. See generally Is Innocence Irrelevant?, supra note 1.
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